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Abstract—Femtocells can be used to improve the indoor
coverage and bandwidth of 3G cellular networks in homes
and buildings. They are designed to be placed in a fixed
location. However, their use would also be interesting in mobile
environments such as public transportation systems. This paper
studies the mobility limitations at the layer 3 and suggests
an approach to support mobility on femtocell networks. This
solution employs the protocols already defined in the femtocell
architecture, minimizing thus the impact on it.
Index Terms—femtocell architecture, mobile femtocell,
MOBIKE, IKEv2, IPsec.
I. INTRODUCTION
Femtocells are small, low-cost and low-power cellular base
stations, typically designed for use in a home or small business
(e.g., a holiday cottage) to improve indoor coverage and band-
width, and also to off-load traffic from the existing macrocell
network [1]. Nowadays, femtocells are usually deployed by
the customers, they have a fixed location (i.e., they do not
move), and they always connect to the 3G core network using
a ciphered IP tunnel through the Internet connection provided
by a Digital Subscriber Line (DSL) or cable router. However,
femtocells could also be interesting in other scenarios.
Trains, buses or trams could provide faster data speeds and
better user experience to theirs passengers setting up femto-
cells. However, supporting mobility on femtocell networks is
a challenge due to their architecture, that was designed to be
fixed.
Our work is focused on supporting mobility on femtocell
networks by suppressing the original fixed interface and setting
a pool of heterogeneous wireless interfaces in its place. Toward
this end, it will be necessary to provide mechanisms that
perform handovers between technologies, ensuring thus conti-
nuity of service to the users. It is expected these handovers will
be performed between different technologies (inter-handover)
or between interfaces of the same technology (intra-handover).
Besides, different Internet service providers could be used in
different interfaces obtaining redundant links and thus reliable
systems.
In this paper, we investigate what modifications would be
necessary at layer 3 (L3) in the femtocell protocol stack to
be able to move femtocells through a heterogeneous wireless
network scenario. As far as we know this is the first proposal of
a change to the femtocecll architecture to support mobility. The
idea is to employ the protocols already defined for femtocells
and therefore minimize the impact on the existing architecture.
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Fig. 1. 3G femtocell network overview
This paper is organized as follows. First, in section II
we briefly review the architecture and terminology used in
conventional femtocells. Then, Section III explains the L3
requirements and next, in Section IV, we present the IKEv2
Mobility and Multihomming (MOBIKE) protocol, an exten-
sion to Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2 (IKEv2) able
to support mobility. In Section V, we propose a mechanism
to integrate MOBIKE into femtocell networks and finally,
Section VI presents the conclusions and future work.
II. FEMTOCELL ARCHITECTURE
3GPP describes in [2] an architecture for 3G femtocells that
includes new entities and interfaces as Figure 1 shows. This
section briefly describes the main entities.
A. Home Node B (HNB)
The HNB is the femtocell. It serves User Equipment (UE)
traffic by means of the UU interface, and sends it to the core
network through the IUH interface. It contains part, or all
the functionality normally associated to an Radio Network
Controller (RNC), and supports HNB and UE registration
procedures over the IUH interface.
B. Home Node B Gateway (HNB-GW)
This element terminates the IUH interface and acts as a
concentrator to aggregate a large number of HNBs. It is seen
as a RNC by the core network which communicates with it
using the existing IU CS , IU PS interfaces.
C. IUH interface
This interface connects the HNB with the HNB-GW. It
defines two new protocols in the control plane to address the
differences between HNBs and the original IU interface:
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 Home Node B Application Part (HNBAP) [3]: it provides
functions for registering UEs and HNBs into the network,
error handling and group management.
 RANAP User Adaptation (RUA) [4]: it provides the
signaling service between HNB and HNB-GW in the
control plane. It is used to send RANAP messages in a
transparent way. It also provides error handling functions.
D. HNB Management System (HMS)
This element facilitates the discovery procedures to the
HNB. It is composed of a TR-069 manager [5] and a file
server. When a HNB is powered up, it will have to auto-
configure using the HMS. The HMS performs location verifi-
cation and assigns local access information to the HNB. This
information is the Serving Security Gateway (S-SeGW), the
Serving HMS (S-HMS) and optionally the HNB-GW. It can
be accessed using the TR-069 protocol in two ways: through
an Intranet (using the established IPsec tunnel) or through the
Internet. 3GPP defines two kind of HMS:
 Initial HMS (I-HMS): it may provide location verification
and assign the S-HMS, S-SeGW and optionally HNB-
GW to the HNB.
 Serving HMS (S-HMS): it has new functions such as
performance and fault updates, and assigns the HNB-GW
during the HNB registration procedure if the I-HMS did
not provide it.
E. Security Gateway (SeGW)
It terminates the IPsec tunnel established with the HNB,
provides mutual authentication, encryption, data integrity and
access to the S-HMS and the HNB-GW. It is a logically
separated entity and it can be implemented as a separate
physical element or into others such as the HNB-GW. 3GPP
defines two kind of SeGW:
 Initial Security Gateway (I-SeGW): its URL may be fac-
tory programmed in the HNB to allow the establishment
of the IPsec tunnel with the I-HMS.
 Serving Security Gateway (S-SeGW): it terminates the
IPsec tunnel and implements a forwarding function to
inject IP packets into the mobile network operator (In-
tranet) that allows the communication with the HNB-GW,
S-HMS and other network elements.
F. Mobility limitations
When an HNB is powered up, a discovery procedure [6]
is triggered to provide local access information to the HNB
depending on its own location and identity. This information
consists on the entities that it needs to provide the service: the
S-HMS, S-SeGW and HNB-GW. Then, the HNB establishes a
SCTP session with the HNB-GW and registers itself sending a
HNB REGISTER REQUESTmessage. This is called the HNB
registration procedure.
Similarly, when an UE connects with a HNB, an UE
registration procedure is triggered to perform access control
for that UE in the HNB-GW. If the operation is successful,
TABLE I
PROPOSED HNB REGISTER UPDATE MESSAGE
PARAMETER PRESENCE
Message type Mandatory
HNB Identity Mandatory
HNB Location Information Mandatory
New IP Mandatory
PLMN-ID Mandatory
Cell-ID Mandatory
LAC Mandatory
RAC Mandatory
SAC Mandatory
a specific context identifier is assigned to that UE to be used
between HNB and HNB-GW.
In the HNB registration procedure, the HNB informs the
HNB-GW that it is available at a particular IP address and
sends some location and identity information. If the femtocell
is moving between different networks, it is expected that its
IP changes and connectivity may be lost. To support mobility,
the HNB should be able to update its IP address and location
information to avoid context identifier losses, which are stored
in the HNB-GW.
Toward this end, we propose the addition of a new HNBAP
message that updates the HNB location and IP address in the
HNB-GW. A possible HNB REGISTER UPDATE message
with some proposed parameters is presented in Table I. (Con-
sequently, it will be defined the HBN REGISTER UPDATE
ACCEPT and HBN REGISTER UPDATE REJECT to indi-
cate if the operation was successful or not).
The IPsec standardized in RFC 4301 could survive itself to
an IP change by indicating how to search a security association
(SA) into the Security Association Database (SAD). The SA
lookup can be made by three manners:
1) Searching for a match on the combination of Security
Parameter Index (SPI), destination and source address.
2) Searching for a match on both SPI and destination
address.
3) Searching for a match on only SPI.
This indication must be set either manually or using an SA
management protocol as IKEv2. Next section focuses in the
last approach.
III. LEVEL 3 REQUIREMENTS
Femtocells were designed to use the IPsec protocol both
in user and control planes. IPsec [7] is a protocol suite for
securing IP communications by authenticating and encrypting
each IP packet of a session. However, IPsec needs a protocol
to establish and maintain security associations.
IKEv2 [8] is a component of IPsec. It is used to perform
mutual authentication between two parties, to establish and to
maintain dynamically SAs for Encapsulating Security Payload
(ESP) [9] or Authentication Header (AH) [10] protocols.
There are several scenarios where IKEv2 can be used and
this paper is centered in one particular case: when an endpoint
is connected to a security gateway using the tunnel mode of
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IPsec, since this is the scenario that femtocell networks deploy
in the IUH interface.
Figure 1 shows the scenario mentioned above. The HNB
(or femtocell) is connected through an IPsec tunnel with the
SeGW that is located within the mobile network operator.
All traffic generated by the femtocell (user data and control
packets) is received by the SeGW and then forwarded through
the mobile network operator.
The IKEv2 protocol uses request/response pairs and every
pair is called exchange. The first exchange in an IKEv2 session
is the IKE_SA_INIT in which security parameters for the
IKE SA are negotiated. If this exchange is completed, the
second exchange, IKE_AUTH, will try to set up a SA for the
ESP or AH protocols. These exchanges are known as Phase 1
of IKEv1.
Nonetheless, peers involved in an IKEv2 session may desire
to transmit control messages to each other in order to inform
about notifications or errors. To reach this behavior, IKEv2
defines an INFORMATIONAL exchange that only can be sent
after the initial exchanges. Hence every message sent at this
point is cryptographically protected with the negotiated keys.
Messages that belong to the INFORMATIONAL exchange
contain zero or more Notify, Delete and Configuration pay-
loads. They have to be confirmed sending some response to the
initiator, even with an empty message. Otherwise the sender
will assume that the message has been lost in the network and
will retransmit it.
The Notify Payload is used to transmit informational data
such as state information or error conditions (e.g., specify why
a SA could not be established). Every type of message has
a concrete value that is specified within the Notify Payload.
However, IANA [11] reserves value ranges for future use.
Some reserved values have been used to create extensions to
IKEv2 and thus provide new capabilities. For instance, in RFC
5685 [12] it is defined a “Redirect Mechanism for IKEv2” that
allows a VPN gateway that is overloaded or it is being shut
down for maintenance to redirect a client to attach another
gateway. Another interesting extension to IKEv2 using Notify
payloads is MOBIKE [13], [14] and it is presented in the next
section.
IV. MOBIKE EXTENSION
IKEv2 itself does not provide any mobility support. MO-
BIKE defines an extension to the existing IKEv2 protocol to
provide secure mobility.
MOBIKE can update the IP addresses associated with an
IPsec tunnel mode security association using an internal API
that provides access to the Security Association and Security
Policy (SPD) Databases. Furthermore, it provides multihoming
features to allow traffic movement between different network
interfaces if for instance, the one that is being used stops
working.
MOBIKE allows a peer to have several IP addresses, e.g., a
road-warrior with different wireless interfaces such as UMTS
or Wi-Fi. However, the decision of which IP address is used
TABLE II
NEW ERROR TYPES DEFINED BY MOBIKE
NOTIFY PAYLOAD MESSAGE TYPE
UNACEPTABLE_ADDRESS 40
UNEXPECTED_NAT_DETECTED 41
TABLE III
NEW STATUS TYPES DEFINED BY MOBIKE
NOTIFY PAYLOAD MESSAGE TYPE
MOBIKE_SUPPORTED 16396
ADDITIONAL_IP4_ADDRESS 16397
ADDITIONAL_IP6_ADDRESS 16398
NO_ADDITIONAL_ADDRESSES 16399
UPDATE_SA_ADDRESSES 16400
COOKIE2 16401
NO_NATS_ALLOWED 16402
for the IPsec SA is made by the initiator peer and it is beyond
of the scope of this protocol.
The standard defines some new IKEv2 notifications whose
values are shown in Tables II and III. Although these messages
are protected by the keys negotiated in the first exchange of
IKEv2 (IKE_SA_INIT), updating an IP address of IPsec
SAs has several security considerations. To address them, two
new features are included: with “return routability check”
one peer can verify if the other party has an available IP
address and therefore can receive packets. Conversely with
“NAT prohibition” it is assured that IP addresses have not been
modified by intermediate agents such as NATs or translation
agents.
A. Mobility issues
As in IKEv2, a MOBIKE session is initiated using the
normal IKE_INIT exchange. After that, in the IKE_AUTH
exchange, every peer informs the other that it supports MO-
BIKE by means of MOBIKE_SUPPORTED notification.
If the initiator changes its IP address it will send an
UPDATE_SA_ADDRESSES notification from the new IP ad-
dress and thereafter it will be the source address. The respon-
der will save this IP and may perform the “return routability
check” of the new address and if it is completed the responder
will start to use it as destination address.
The responder does not normally update any IPsec SA
unless it receives an explicit UPDATE_SA_ADDRESSES noti-
fication from the initiator. However, the update process can be
triggered by IKEv2 events. Next events can cause the initiator
to re-evaluate its address selection policy, and may trigger an
IP address change:
 Several IKEv2 requests have been transmitted and no
reply has been received. This suggests that the path is
no longer working.
 Receiving an ADDITIONAL_IP4_ADDRESS,
ADDITIONAL_IP6_ADDRESS or
NO_ADDITIONAL_ADDRESS notification means
the addresses may have changed.
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 Receiving an UNACCEPTABLE_ADDRESSES notifica-
tion as a response to an address update means that the
update was not carried out.
 Receiving a NAT_DETECTION_DESTINATION_IP [8]
notification by the initiator that does not match with the
UPDATE_SA_ADDRESSES response. This means that
address has changed.
B. Multihoming support
MOBIKE also manages multihoming devices. One
peer may inform that it has several IP addresses
sending an ADDITIONAL_IP4_ADDRESS (or
ADDITIONAL_IP6_ADDRESS) notification in the
IKE_AUTH exchange. These messages contain a list of
available IP addresses where the peer can receive packets.
Due to the mobility nature of this scenario it is likely
that the IP pool changes depending on the peer location. To
overcome this issue, MOBIKE uses the same two messages
mentioned above to update the list of IP addresses available.
Note that it will have to send the whole list and not just IPs that
have changed (i.e., there are no separate add/delete operations)
replacing the old list.
Both the initiator and responder can send a list of avail-
able IP addresses but it is the initiator who uses it as
an input to its address selection policy. The initiator may
decide to move traffic to an address of the list sending an
UPDATE_SA_ADDRESSES.
On the other hand, the responder only uses the ini-
tiator (and its own) list when its current address may
no longer work and it wants to update the address set.
It uses both lists to determine which pair of addresses
to use for sending the ADDITIONAL_IP4_ADDRESS (or
ADDITIONAL_IP6_ADDRESS) message.
V. PROPOSED METHOD
MOBIKE protocol defines a mechanism to provide secure
mobility but it does no specify how the initiator makes the
decision to update an IP address, i.e., when it is initiated, what
information is taking into account, how preferences affect the
decision. . . Designing a system that decides when an update IP
address procedure has to be triggered may be crucial in real
scenarios, moreover when it is moving.
This section presents some design criteria that should be
taken into account in order to build a system able to trigger
a handoff procedure and thus changing from one wireless
interface to another depending on the environment measure-
ment at a given time. Note that we include inter-technology
handover, where it is performed between different wireless
technologies (e.g., WiMAX to UMTS handoff) and intra-
technology handover, that implies, at least, the use of two
different interfaces of the same technology (e.g., Wi-Fi to
Wi-Fi handoff). Using several wireless interfaces from the
same technology we can also build reliable systems due to
the redundant links.
We propose the use of MOBIKE on femto-architectures to
address the mobility limitations encountered at L3. Specifi-
IKE_SA_INIT request
IKE_SA_INIT response
HNB SeGW
IKE_AUTH request (MOBIKE_SUPPORTED)
IKE_AUTH response (MOBIKE_SUPPORTED)
IP1 IP2
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Handoff
[1] INFORMATIONAL request (UPDATE_SA_ADDRESSES)
[2] INFORMATIONAL response 
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[4] INFORMATIONAL response (COOKIE2)
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Fig. 2. MOBIKE handoff procedure
cally, to maintain in a secure way the IPsec tunnel established
over the IUH interface.
We show in Figure 2 how the handoff procedure between
a HNB and a SeGW would be if MOBIKE protocol were
implemented in both parties.
The first step is the normal IKEv2 IKE_SA_INIT ex-
change. Then, the HNB and SeGW inform each other that they
support MOBIKE sending MOBIKE_SUPPORTED notification
(IKE_AUTH exchange). Finally the IPsec SA is established
between the addresses taken from the IKE SA, IP1 and IP2.
Suppose after a while a new IP address, IP3, is obtained
by other interface and a handover is triggered by decision
of the HNB. The HNB should notify that there is a change
in its own IP address sending an UPDATE_SA_ADDRESSES
notification from the new IP address, i.e., IP3. When this
notification is received by the SeGW, it records the new IP and
performs a “return routability check” of that address sending
an INFORMATIONAL request with a COOKIE2 notification.
The COOKIE2 notification is added to ensure that the HNB
has seen the request after sending a response. If both values
do not match, the IKE SA must be closed. Otherwise, if the
check is completed, SeGW starts using IP3 as the destination
address for its traffic.
Although both initiator (HNB) and responder (SeGW)
could have sent ADDITIONAL_IP4_ADDRESS (or
ADDITIONAL_IP6_ADDRESS) notifications in the
IKE_AUTH exchange to inform each other that they
have a set of available IP addresses, just the initiator uses it
as an input to its address selection policy. On the contrary,
the responder only uses this list when it needs to update its
own list and its current IP is not working.
Therefore, it seems a good idea to use the initiator list by
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the responder to recover a connection when the initiator is not
responding and an UPDATE_SA_ADDRESSES has not been
received. If the responder suspects there is a problem with the
current initiator IP, it should check its validity sending some
packets. If no response is received after a while, the responder
should discard the current IP and it should test the next IP in
the initiator list. If a response is received, it should send an
UPDATE_SA_ADDRESSES to switch to the new address. To
this end, a timer should be configured according with some
quality criteria (establishing a minimum delay acceptable,
for instance). When the timer expires, the responder should
consider the initiator unreachable and it should start checking
the next IPs in the list.
A. Delay considerations
In MOBIKE, every time an initiator device performs a hand-
off procedure, several messages are exchanged. Depending
on the throughput of the crossed mediums these messages
will reach their destination at a given time. In addition some
technologies have different throughput in their uplink and
downlink, thus the delay varies according to that fact.
In Figure 2, time required by a handoff process is the
time that has passed between message 1 and message 4.
Let Ttx update, Ttx update ack, Ttx verify , Ttx verify ack
denote the transmission time required for the messages 1,
2, 3 and 4 in the handoff procedure, Tprop the propagation
delay associated with the crossed mediums and Tproc the
time required for a device to process a request and build a
response. The time required to complete a handoff procedure,
Thandoff , is represented by the following expression assuming
the propagation and processing delay are negligible:
Thandoff = Ttx update + Ttx update ack
+ Ttx verify + Ttx verify ack (1)
Note that the transmission times depends on the throughput
and the packet size. Indeed, if the network is asymmet-
rical regarding to speed (UMTS, WiMAX, LTE. . . ) mes-
sages that are sent through the uplink will take longer than
those that are received through the downlink. In our case,
Ttx update and Ttx verify ack are sent through the uplink
and Ttx update ack and Ttx verify through the downlink.
Although the propagation delay is considered negligible
compared with the transmission times, in some scenarios this
delay should be considered. Propagation delay depends on
the medium speed and the distance between both parties.
Thus, if the medium speed is very low and the distance high
the propagation delay should be considered in the previous
expression, furthermore if the device is moving at a high speed
and the delay may be critical. Now, the Thandoff expression
is represented by:
Thandoff = Ttx update + Ttx update ack
+ Ttx verify + Ttx verify ack
+ 2Tprop UL + 2Tprop DL (2)
However, if a handoff is triggered and the “return routability
check” is performed, messages that belong to this process can
be also sent into the first INFORMATIONAL exchange (mes-
sages 1 and 2 in the Figure 2), i.e., including the COOKIE2
payload into it. With this strategy Tprop DL and Tprop DL
would be suppressed in (2) but Ttx update and Ttx update ack
would be higher due to the packet size increases.
Delay is an important issue to take into account when
systems have been design to ensure continuity of service,
moreover when the system is moving through a heterogeneous
wireless network, where the throughput can be different in
every hop. In addition, it may be critical if the system is
moving at high speeds and the size of the following cell is
small, since the period of time available to perform handover
decreases. Therefore, it is necessary to address the limitations
resulting from the delay taking them into account in the design
phase of the system.
In the handoff procedure the throughput measured in the
uplink should be considered, since it is always the slowest link
in every wireless technology (in symmetrical technologies both
links have the same speed). Since MOBIKE performs hard-
handover (i.e., it does not use both links at the same time) two
scenarios can be seen depending on the speed of the mediums
crossed:
1) If the femtocell moves from a slow medium to a faster
one, it will be more efficient if the handoff is performed
as soon as possible, using the fastest link for long time
and thus obtaining a better performance.
2) If the femtocell moves from a fast medium to a slower
one, it will be more efficient if the handoff waits, as far
as feasible, exploiting thus the use of the faster medium.
Next section discusses other issues to perform an efficient
handoff procedure regarding to the received power.
B. Power-driven threshold
In this theoretical approach we are assuming that a femtocell
can be connected to several wireless network interfaces such
as Wi-Fi, UMTS, WiMAX, etc. All these technologies have
different features and requirements, and it would be helpful if
the femtocell could use the most suitable one at a given time.
In mobile environments it is expected that handovers occur
frequently, hence the importance to perform them efficiently
(to a suitable technology, at a given time).
We propose the Power-driven threshold approach, that con-
sists on establishing a quality threshold in terms of received
power. Its value will be normalized to be the same in all
technologies, since every one has a concrete range of received
power required for an acceptable performance. Whenever the
system obtains an IP from a given technology, it will be
set as available if its received power is above the threshold.
Moreover, if there are several available technologies in the
pool, the selected one to perform the handover will be decided
based on policies such as cost, bandwidth, security. . .
The handover to other available technology must be trig-
gered when the received power of the used link lowers and
reaches the threshold. Then, a rule set will be applied over the
available technologies to decide which is the most suitable
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Fig. 3. Power-driven threshold scheme
one. These rules will be defined considering the network
performance, cost, bandwidth, security and so on.
In Figure 3 we represent a graph to show the Power-driven
threshold behavior. The vertical axis depicts the normalized
received power in the femtocell and horizontal axis depicts
the path that it follows. The threshold has been placed to
normalized power T .
Let us assume that in the initial location, S0, the femtocell
is being served by Wi-Fi and its source IP is IP1. Due to
its mobility it may detect some other available technologies
along the path. When the femtocell crosses S1 the UMTS
received power is stronger than Wi-Fi. However, the handover
will not be perform until S2 due to the threshold constraint.
Then, the femtocell sets IP2 as a source IP. Some hysteresis
will be included in the threshold to avoid bounding between
technologies in border areas.
After a while, the femtocell is being served by UMTS.
When it reaches S3, the received power of the WiMAX and
Wi-Fi signals are above the threshold (and above the UMTS
signal that is being used). At this moment the femtocell would
have two alternative IP addresses in the pool, IP3 and IP4
obtained respectively by WiMAX and Wi-Fi. When the UMTS
power reaches the threshold value at S4, a decision process
will be triggered to decide which of both technologies is the
most suitable to perform the handover, by applying the rule
set. For instance, a rule could be defined to prefer Wi-Fi over
WiMAX because of the cost or to prefer WiMAX over UMTS
because of the bandwidth.
Due to the waiting constraint, this technique decreases the
number of handoff procedures and thus the messages sent, that
seems to be an advantage in mobile environments (especially
when the speed is high). However, the efficiency can be reduce
when the femtocell is moving from a slow to a faster medium,
since it is using the slower one until the threshold is reached.
This approach could be improved by using location pre-
diction algorithms such as the ones shown in [15] if for
instance the femtocell path is known a priori as occurs in
public transportation scenarios.
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
This paper explained the MOBIKE protocol and presented
a novel approach to integrate it into a femtocell scenario
to support mobility management in the IUH interface and
between the HNB and the SeGW.
We have studied some considerations at L3 to support
mobility on femtocell networks. However, some of them may
interfere in the behavior of upper layers.
In their control plane, femtocells implements SCTP that is
also a multihoming protocol able to support mobility at the
transport layer. We are now working on the implications using
MOBIKE over SCTP have, and on how to integrate them to
work together reusing information, such as the change of IP
address in L3.
Similarly, we are studying what implications MOBIKE over
GPRS Tunnelling Protocol User Plane (GTP-U) have, since
it is used by the femtocells in the user plane at the Packet
Switched (PS) domain and tunnels are also used.
Finally, we are simulating and testing some MOBIKE
scenarios using strongSWAN [16] to evaluate the Thandoff
defined theoretically according to different paths and speed.
Then, it will be investigated how to relate it with the power
threshold and the femtocell speed in order to build an efficient
system able to provide continuity of service to its customers.
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